T. V. Bibik
Educational and Scientific Institute of Atomic and Thermal Power Engineering, National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”, 37, Beresteyskyi Ave, Kyiv, 03056, Ukraine
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0134-6022
V. H. Honcharuk
Educational and Scientific Institute of Atomic and Thermal Power Engineering, National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”, 37, Beresteyskyi Ave, Kyiv, 03056, Ukraine
https://orcid.org/0009-0007-9647-1462
DOI: doi.org/10.31717/2311-8253.26.2.4
Abstract
The article addresses the relevant problem of the emergence of a new type of threat to the physical protection systems of critical infrastructure facilities associated with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with fiber-optic channels for control and video data transmission. It is noted that the application of fiber-optic communication significantly changes existing security approaches, since such aerial vehicles are practically insensitive to traditional means of electronic countermeasures that are widely used in modern physical protection systems. The technical and operational advantages of multirotor unmanned aerial vehicles with fiber-optic control are analyzed in the context of overcoming existing physical protection barriers, including the possibility of covert approach to protected facilities, resistance to radio signal suppression, and the provision of a stable control channel under complex electromagnetic conditions. Particular attention is paid to the assessment of the availability of components and technologies required for the manufacture of such aerial vehicles in unauthorized or home environments, as well as to the analysis of approximate financial costs associated with their production. The paper examines the risks that unmanned aerial vehicles with fiber-optic communication may pose to the safe operation of nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructure facilities, taking into account possible scenarios of their use by malicious actors. Directions for improving organizational and legal protection measures are proposed, and the feasibility of introducing amendments to the legislation of Ukraine aimed at restricting private access to key components that may be used to create fiber-optic control channels for unmanned aerial vehicles is substantiated.
Keywords: physical protection systems, nuclear power plants, unmanned aerial vehicles, fiber-optic communication channel, electronic countermeasures, legislative restrictions, nuclear security, critical infrastructure vulnerability, counterUAV measures, organizational and legal protection measures.
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